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STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION AND 
NATURE OF PROCEEDINGS 
This is an appeal from the denial by the Third District Court, the Honorable 
Robert Adkins, Judge presiding, of the defendant's Motion to Withdraw Defendant's P\ea 
of Guilty (R. 104, Motion, Tr. p. 9). 
The Court of Appeals has jurisdiction of this matter pursuant to §78-2a-3(2)(e), 
U.C.A., as amended. 
STATEMENT OF ISSUES PRESENTED FOR REVIEW, STANDARD 
OF APPELLATE REVIEW, PRESERVATION OF ISSUES 
AND GROUNDS FOR APPEAL 
I. Ineffective Assistance of Counsel. 
A Issue: The first issue presented by this appeal is whether the defense 
counsel's failure to support defendant's motion to withdraw his guilty plea with an 
affidavit, cause the witness to be present at the time of hearing, or request a continuance 
in order to produce the witness constituted ineffective assistance of counsel. 
B Standard of Review: The standard of review with respect to the issue of 
ineffective assistance of counsel raised for the first time on appeal presents a question of 
law which is reviewed for correctness. State v. Coxx 2007 UT. App. 317, lj 10, 169 P.3d 
806. 
C. Grounds for Review: The factual underpinnings of this issue arE 
preserved in the transcript of the hearing before the trial court August 7, 2007 (R. 85-88; 
R. 104, Motion, Tr.). The issue of ineffective assistance of counsel was not raised in the 
trial court, but may be raised for the first time on appeal. State v. Harper, 2006 UT App 
178,17, 136 P.3rd 1261. 
II. Plain Error. 
A. Issue: The second question presented by this appeal is whether the trial 
court's failure to continue the hearing on defendant's Motion to Withdraw Defendant's 
Plea of Guilty in order for defendant's counsel to produce the identified and allegedly 
exculpatory witness constituted plain error. 
B. Standard of Review: The standard of review with respect to the 
commission of plain error is that the trial court's ruling will be reversed only if (i) an error 
exists; (ii) the error should have been obvious to the trial court; and (iii) the error is 
harmful, i.e., absent the error, there is a reasonable likelihood of a more favorable 
outcome for the defendant. State v. Diaz-Aravalo, 2008 UT App 219, H 8 (June, 2008). 
C. Grounds for Review: The factual underpinnings of this issue are 
preserved in the transcript of the hearing before the trial court August 7, 2007 (R. 85-88; 
R. 104, Motion, Tr.). The issue of plain error of counsel was not raised in the trial court, 
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but may be raised for the first time on appeal. State v. Harper, 2006 UT App 178, \ 7, 
136 P.3rd 1261. 
CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS AND STATUTES 
A statutory provision of central importance to this appeal is the statute relevant to 
entry and withdrawal of pleas. The relevant statute is set forth in its entirety as follows: 
77-13-6. Withdrawal of plea, U.C.A., 2004. 
(1) A plea of not guilty may be withdrawn at any time prior to 
conviction. 
(2)(a) A plea of guilty or no contest may be withdrawn only upon leave of 
the court and a showing that it was not knowingly and voluntarily made. 
(b) A request to withdraw a plea of guilty or no contest, except for a 
plea held in abeyance, shall be made by motion before sentence is 
announced. Sentence may not be announced unless the motion is denied. For a 
plea held in abeyance, a motion to withdraw the plea shall be made within 
30 days of pleading guilty or no contest. 
(c) Any challenge to a guilty plea not made within the time period 
specified in Subsection (2)(b) shall be pursued under Title 78, 
Chapter 35a, Post-Conviction Remedies Act, and Rule 65C, Utah Rules of Civil 
Procedure. 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
A. Nature of the case, course of proceedings, and disposition in court below. 
This is an appeal from a conviction based upon a plea of guilty to three counts of 
an Information (R. 62), June 18, 2007, wherein the trial court on August 7, 2007 denied 
the defendant's motion to withdraw his plea of guilty (R. 85-88; R. 104, Motion, Tr.).. 
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B. Statement of facts relevant to the issues presented for review. 
The defendant was a passenger in a car stopped for a traffic violation on March 26, 
2007 (R.2). As a result of statements of the driver of the vehicle and search of the area 
in and about the passenger area, contraband was found and the defendant arrested (R. 2-
3). He was charged in the Third District Court in an Information filed April 4, 2007 with 
Unlawful Possession of a Controlled Substance, a Third Degree Felony, in violation of 
§58-37-8(2)(a)(i), U.C.A., as amended; Giving False Information to a Police Officer, a 
Class C Misdemeanor, §76-8-506(1), U.C.A., as amended; and Unlawful Possession of 
Drug Paraphernalia, a Class B Misdemeanor, §58-37a-5 , U.C.A., as amended (R. 1-6). 
A preliminary hearing was held on May 24, 2008, the defendant was bound over for trial 
and pleas of not guilty were entered (Doc. p. 5). 
On or about June 18, 2007 the defendant changed his plea to guilty to all three 
counts of the Information (R. 62). At the time of changing his plea, the trial court 
dismissed a companion case, pursuant to a plea agreement (Statement of Defendant in 
Support of Guilty Plea and Certificate of Counsel, R. 48-61, at 55; Guilty Plea Tr. p. 10). 
On or about August 7, 2007, the defendant filed a one page motion to withdraw 
defendant's guilty plea on the basis that the plea of guilty was not "knowingly, 
intelligently, and voluntarily entered," and citing discovery of a witness previously 
unknown to either the State or the defense (R.76). A hearing on the motion was held 
August 14, 2007, the Honorable Robert Adkins, Judge presiding (R. 85-88; R. 104, 
Motion, Tr.). 
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At the hearing on the motion, defendant's trial counsel, Heather Chestnut, 
indicated that there was newly discovered evidence in the form of a witness who would 
testify that he had knowledge that was exculpatory to the defendant (R. 104, Motion, Tr. 
p. 5). She stated the following, 
We discovered another witness after Mr. McKnight was released that we didn't 
know of before that was not in the police report. The witness is a Jared Osmond 
who can testify that - - well, it (sic.) proffer enough facts so that it makes sense. 
It's a constructive possession defence for this possession of a controlled substance 
case. Mr. McKnight was a passenger in a vehicle that was stopped. Controlled 
substances were found, and Mr. McKnight was cited for the offense based on the 
statement of the driver that the controlled substances belonged to him. 
We have a witness who can testify that the driver admitted to him of using 
controlled substances and being in possession of the controlled substances. So 
that is the basis for the withdrawal of the guilty plea. We did not have that 
information at the time the guilty plea was entered. (Motion, Tr., p. 5) 
Counsel did not support the motion with an affidavit of Mr. Osmond (Motion to 
Withdraw Defendant's Guilty Plea, R. 76-78), did not produce him at the time set for 
hearing, nor did she request a continuance to obtain his presence (R. 104, Motion, Tr., p. 
6,8). 
In the absence of the testimony of Jared Osmond, the Trial Court denied the 
motion to withdraw defendant's guilty plea. Judge Adkins direct statement on the subject 
was, "(\ys not helpful to the Court to have some witness who is not present in Court, and 
to not produce that witness and not have the witness available so the court can judge 
whether or not the witness is credible in this instance . . ." (R. 104, Motion Tr., p. 9). 
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SUMMARY OF ARGUMENTS 
1. Defendant's trial counsel rendered ineffective assistance in her failure to 
support the defendant's motion to withdraw his guilty plea with an affidavit of the alleged 
exculpatory witness, producing the witness at the time of hearing, or requesting a 
continuance in order to produce the witness. 
2. The District Court committed plain error in failing to sua sponte continue 
the hearing in order to allow defense counsel to procure the presence of the purported 
exculpatory witness. 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I 
BY FAILING TO SUPPORT THE DEFENDANT'S MOTION TO WITHDRAW 
HIS GUILTY PLEA WITH AN AFFIDAVIT OF AN ALLEGED EXCULPATORY 
WITNESS, PRODUCING THE WITNESS AT HEARING ON THE MOTION, OR 
REQUESTING A CONTINUANCE IN ORDER TO PRODUCE THE WITNESS, 
DEFENDANT WAS DEPRIVED OF THE EFFECTIVE ASSISTANCE OF 
COUNSEL. 
This issue has been raised, tangentially, in defendant's motion to remand this 
matter for an evidentiary hearing pursuant to Rule 23B, Utah Rules of Appellate 
Procedure, filed March 26, 2008, which was denied April 15, 2008, and subsequent 
motion for reconsideration filed May 13, 2008, which was denied June 5, 2008. The 
defendant re-asserts his position herein as may be appropriate to preserve the issues 
raised and clarify the defendant's position in the admittedly unlikely event it may have 
been misapprehended. 
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The question of ineffective assistance of counsel is governed by the two-part test 
enunciated in Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668 (1984). The defendant is required 
to establish (1) "that counsel's performance was deficient," and (2) "that the deficient 
performance prejudiced the defense." State v. Eyre, 2008 UT 16, f 16, (Utah, February 
2008) quoting Strickland at 687. As to the first prong of Strickland, 
The seriousness of those errors is measured by whether 
"counsel's representation fell below an objective standard 
of reasonableness." Specifically, "[a] convicted defendant. . . 
must identify the acts or omissions of counsel that are alleged 
not to have been the result of reasonable professional judgment. 
(Footnotes omitted) 
State v. Eyre, at ^ 16, quoting Strickland at 687, 688. 
In this instance, at the time McKnight's Motion to Withdraw Defendant's Plea of 
Guilty came before the trial court, defendant's trial counsel merely stated orally what she 
believed the newly discovered witness would testify, in a very general manner. She had 
neither supported the Motion with an affidavit, made arrangements for the witness to be 
present at the time of the Motion, nor did she request a continuance in order to obtain the 
presence of the witness. 
It has been established that newly discovered evidence may be grounds to 
withdraw a guilty plea even if the colloquy at the time of the plea complied with Rule 11 
Utah Rules of Criminal Procedure. State v. Gallegos, 738 P.2d 1040 (Utah 1987). As a 
general principle, withdrawal of a guilty plea is a privilege and not a right. Id. at 1041, 
citing State v. Hanson, 627 P.2d 53, 54 (Utah 1981); State v. GotschalX, 570 P.2d 1029, 
7 
1030 (Utah 1977). However, "The rationale for allowing a defendant to withdraw a 
guilty plea is to permit him to undo a plea which was unknowingly, unintelligently, or 
involuntarily made." Gallegos at 1041, citing United States v. Carr, 740 F.2d 339, 345 
(5th Cir. 1984), cert, denied, 471 U.S. 1004, 105 S.Ct. 1865, 85 L.Ed.2d 159 (1985). The 
granting of a motion to withdraw a plea of guilty is therefore within the sound discretion 
of the trial court. Gallegos at 1041. 
In Gallegos the defendant had entered a guilty plea to aggravated sexual assault. 
Before sentencing Gallegos' counsel timely moved to withdraw his plea on the grounds 
of newly discovered evidence supporting his motion with an affidavit of the victim 
wherein she recanted her preliminary hearing testimony, stating that she had lied due to 
pressure from her parents. The district court denied the motion and sentenced Gallegos 
to ten years to life. Id. at 1041. 
The Gallegos Court went on to "outline the necessary procedure when such 
motions are grounded on issues going to the merits of the case." Id. at 1041. The 
Supreme Court stated as follows: 
In evaluating the reasons advanced for a presentence motion to 
withdraw a guilty plea, we accept the view that trial courts 
should not attempt to decide the merits of a claim related 
directly to the merits of the charge against the defendant, thus 
passing on the question of his guilt or innocence. (Citation omitted) However, 
where such a motion raises issues that are only tangential in 
nature, that is to say they have no direct relation to the merits 
of the case, the court may hold an evidentiary hearing on the 
issues and determine whether they show a fair and just reason for 
granting leave to withdraw the plea. (Citation omitted) 
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Application of the foregoing principles to the totality of 
circumstances in this case prompts the conclusion that the 
district court abused its discretion. The district court denied 
defendant's motion for withdrawal based on the technical and 
speculative grounds that no new evidence had been discovered and 
that the purported victim may have been coerced into changing her 
story. In our view, the district court was apprised of critical 
new evidence which cast doubt on defendant's guilt, evidence 
which, if believed by the finder of fact at trial, could result 
in acquittal. In refusing to set the plea aside, the district 
court appears to have been influenced by the prosecutor's 
suggestion that the victim was either coerced or cajoled by 
defendant into recanting her earlier testimony. However, there 
was no direct evidence to support this claim, and defendant 
denied any improper conduct. On appeal, the State makes the same 
argument and urges that we sustain the trial court lest defendant 
be allowed to subvert the judicial process by his alleged 
influence over the witness. The difficulty with this argument is 
that the credibility of the witness's recantation and, 
ultimately, defendant's guilt or innocence are matters left to 
the determination of the jury after hearing all the evidence. 
Trial and appellate courts should not refuse to permit a matter 
to go to trial because they may not be persuaded by new and 
indisputably pivotal evidence. (Citation omitted) 
Id. at 1041, 1042. 
The granting of a motion to withdraw a plea of guilty is within the sound 
discretion of the trial court. Id. at 1041. In the instant matter, the newly discovered 
evidence in the form a nominally exculpatory witness was ostensibly the sole basis of Mr. 
McKnight's motion. Counsel's failure to support the motion with at least Mr. Osmond's 
affidavit, or produce him at the time set for hearing, or in any event request a continuance 
for the purpose of doing so, left the trial court little alternative but to deny the motion, or 
as is argued in Point II hereinafter, sua sponte, continue the matter to allow counsel to 
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produce the witness. As Judge Adkins stated, "(I)t's not helpful to the Court to have 
some witness who is not present in Court." (R. 104, Motion Tr., p. 9). 
Under the circumstances, with the short shrift given the Motion by trial counsel, 
the trial court had little choice but to deny it. Consequently, counsel's failure to provide a 
competent evidentiary basis for the district court to make a sound determination under the 
procedure set forth in Gallegos, was performance which "fell below the objective 
standard of reasonableness" and amounted to "deficient performance" under the 
Strickland test. 
The question of whether such failure was prejudicial is more difficult. Counsel 
herein for defendant conducted a computer search under current version of 77-13-6, 
U.C.A., enacted in 2000 and prior versions. Of the 97 some cases retrieved, counsel has 
found no instance wherein the State has appealed upon the district court granting a 
motion to withdraw a plea of guilty, regardless of whether the "good cause" standard 
under the earlier standard was employed or the requirement of a "a showing that it was 
not knowingly and voluntarily made" standard under the current statute was brought to 
bear. 
Defendant previously argued in its motion for reconsideration under Rule 23B that 
the only reliable path to knowing whether the defendant was prejudiced by counsel's 
failure and the trial court's denial, is for a hearing to be held on remand. A trial court's 
ruling on a motion to withdraw a guilty plea is reviewed for abuse of discretion. State v. 
Beckstead, 2006 UT 42, ^ 7, 140 P.3d 1288. The unavoidable conclusion from a review 
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of the appellate cases on the subject is that the trial court has substantial discretion in 
granting a motion to withdraw, discretion which, as a practical matter, is seldom, if ever, 
questioned. That is not to suggest that trial courts can grant motions to set aside guilty 
pleas with impunity, but the appellate record seems to indicate that the limits of 
discretion to do so are a good deal more forgiving than those on the side of denial. Thus 
the only sensible procedure for determining if in fact the defendant was prejudiced by 
trial counsel's failures is to remand this matter for an evidentiary hearing in order for the 
trial judge to make a ruling as to whether under all the circumstances he would have 
granted or not granted the motion to withdraw the guilty plea had it been properly 
supported. 
POINT II 
BY FAILING TO SUA SPONTE CONTINUE THE HEARING ON 
DEFENDANT'S MOTION TO WITHDRAW HIS PLEA OF GUILTY IN ORDER 
FOR THE DEFENDANT TO PRODUCE AN ALLEGED EXCULPATORY 
WITNESS, THE TRIAL COURT COMMITTED PLAIN ERROR. 
As a general rule, a trial court's ruling on a motion to withdraw a guilty plea is 
reviewed for abuse of discretion. State v. Beckstead, supra, % 7. The trial court's "findings 
of fact made in connection with a ruling on the motion to withdraw a guilty plea" are 
reviewed for clear error. Id. Lastly "the ultimate question of whether the [trial] court 
strictly complied with constitutional and procedural requirements for entry of a guilty 
plea [as] a question of law . . . for correctness." Id. ^ 8 (internal quotation marks omitted). 
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The threshold requirement for a valid guilty plea is that the defendant entered into 
it knowingly and voluntarily. See id. ^[10. Conversely, the standard for setting aside a 
plea of guilty upon a motion to withdraw is that it was "not knowingly and voluntarily 
made." 77-13-6(2)(a), U.C.A. 2000. 
Rule 11 of the Utah Rules of Criminal Procedure not only requires that the 
defendant enter the plea knowingly and voluntarily, but also outlines certain questions 
judges should ask when determining the nature of the plea. See Utah R. Crim. P. 11; 
Beckstead, ^ 10. After engaging in a rule 11 colloquy, the trial court "must then receive 
from the defendant an affirmation that he committed the offense to which he is pleading 
guilty, that he knows of and understands the rights he is surrendering, and that his plea is 
voluntary." Id. 
The defendant does not dispute that the rule 11 colloquy which took place 
in this matter evidences no misunderstanding on the part of the defendant, nor is there 
any indicia of duress or compulsion which might cause there to be a question with respect 
to the voluntariness thereof. However, at the time of defendant's hearing on his motion 
to withdraw his guilty plea, trial counsel represented to the court that the plea was not 
entered knowingly and voluntarily, that there were other factors which affected the 
defendant's decision of which the court should be aware, specifically a newly discovered 
witness, and the court was specifically informed of what might be the substance of the 
witness' testimony. 
The court merely stated, "(I)t's not helpful to the Court to have some witness who 
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is not present in Court." (R. 104, Motion Tr., p. 9). In other words, the trial court could 
not say with confidence if the witness' live testimony would have inclined the court 
toward allowing the defendant's plea of guilty to be withdrawn. 
Under the plain error doctrine, reversal is required if (i) an error exists; (ii) the 
error should have been obvious to the trial court; and (iii) the error is harmful, i.e., absent 
the error, there is a reasonable likelihood of a more favorable outcome for the defendant. 
State v. Cox, supra, % 10. 
In this matter, the defendant has previously presented a motion and subsequent 
motion for reconsideration to this court pursuant to Rule 23B requesting that the matter 
be remanded for consideration. See Point I. As previously argued in Point I, the trial 
court has the discretion, not of course unfettered or plenary, but in practical terms 
certainly very broad. In fact, as near as counsel herein can determine, the State has never 
questioned at the appellate level the granting of a motion to withdraw on abuse of 
discretion grounds. Consequently, if for whatever reason the trial judge were to 
determine that the defendant is entitled to withdraw his plea, based upon his perception of 
the witness called to testify, it would be difficult for the State to contend that granting of 
the defendant's motion to withdraw his plea would be an abuse of discretion. Thus the 
failure to continue the matter for production of the witness was plain error. 
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CONCLUSION 
Judge Adkins's Order denying the defendant's motion to withdraw his guilty plea 
should be reversed. This matter should be remanded with directions to the district court 
to hold a hearing, permitting defense counsel to procure the presence of the witness 
identified by trial counsel, to determine if the defendant should be allowed to withdraw 
his guilty plea. 
DATED this i  ^ day of 
SCHEL BULLEN 
ttorney for Defendant/Appellant 
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